Wednesday, January 25, 2017

Ethics and Morality in Warfare (UAS)
Scott E. Leishman
ASCI 638- Human Factors in Unmanned Aero Sys
Assignment 9.5
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide
January 26, 2017











With the onslaught of wars that we have encountered, in pursuit of combating the global war on terrorism, many unmanned systems have contributed to the success rate of finding, targeting, and eliminating terrorists and terrorist organizations. The general public was first made aware of this usage during the attacks that occurred after the Terrorist attacks in 2001. Warfare operations that included unmanned systems has expanded exponentially, and can be attributed to advancements in our technological development, as well as refining our human factors. Because human factors have not been completely mitigated, we still have many serious challenges ahead for employment of these systems in remote destinations. Other outstanding factors include the ethical and moral stigma attached to employing these unmanned systems, especially if these systems are associated with distinction and proportionality. Traditionally these concerns are addressed in the uniformed code of military justice (UCMJ) as well as other specific militaries laws, like armed conflict and rules of engagement; when we include unmanned systems in this discussion, we need to be cognizant of the idea that certain boundaries of these laws will need to be readdressed due to the lack of clarity.
            When discussing this realm of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), we need to understand the many different, and often complex and varied human factors involved. We need to understand how to effectively use UAS and what impacts human factors may have. In each phase of an operation, a different human factor comes in to be an influence, and we need to address those factors. Amongst the most common and often times most detrimental human factor issue in any operation, is the lack of situational awareness.  This generally occurs in due part to the common use of the command and control method, referred to as direct interface. This is described as an area where the pilot flying the UAS is interfacing with that UAS via controls and a video stream that has been equipped on the aircraft (Fong, & Thorpe, 2001).
            Within the UAS environment, direct interface has proven to be one of the most challenging, as well as most common area of a loss of situational awareness, and experts agree (Fong, & Thorpe, 2001). Frequently pilots are unable to detect terrain and obstruction clearences due to the usage of direct interface, resulting in catastrophe.  Another key issue with this is the high demand for a cognitive intensive workload to a single person; using this direct interface method, many times the pilot is stuck in a human to machine interface, which is not an easy way to keep and maintain a constant level of awareness (Trouvain & Research Establishment for Applied Sciences Wachtberg-Werthhoven, 2006).
            When we talk about ethical and moral issues, warfare in of itself is wrought with these types of issues; adding UAS to this equation and any operations carried out become substantially more complex. The principles of distinction and proportionality serve as two of the most critical issues in regards to moral and ethical issues.  While UAS have given our allied forces a distinctive advantage, we still face two very important challenges that need to be addressed. Again, distinction and proportionality are the primary concerns. When discussing the topic of distinction, we are discussing the purposeful disparity between civilians and soldiers, as well as properties and military objectives alike (Kreps & Kaag, 2012).
Because distinction averts and excludes intentional attack or use of force against civilians and their properties, we need to understand proportionality; proportionality refers to using a suitable amount of force to achieve a specific military objective, without unnecessary damage to civilians.  This idea of proportionality then falls on the UAS operator, who then has to ensure that they are doing anything and everything to consider what harm they will bring to a civilian population, while gaining a tactical advantage in the battlefield, and that that advantage outweighs the damage to civilians (Kreps & Kaag, 2012).
            We need to understand how to adequately employ UAS and what ramifications continued employment of UAS will mean in warfare. We have to consider that less ground forces are utilized to complete a successful prosecution of a target when comparing it to use without UAS. Accordingly, these legal forms of warfare, allow a nation to protect a service member and are a long term investment into the National security of that country. We still need to consider the ethical and moral issues at bay, and need to keep those issues within the acceptable boundaries and constraints of UAS employment in a wartime setting. Ultimately having improved capabiliites will help to better prepare us for issues such as distinction and proportionality, because targeting systems can be more advanced, use of deadly force can be concentrated on a much more specific area, and smaller weapon systems can be developed that generate enough lethal force, with minimal damage to civilian populations.
     

References
Fong, Terrence and Charles Thorpe. Autonomous Robots 11.1 (2001): 9-18. Web. 26 Jan. 2017. DOI: 10.1023/a:1011295826834.
Kreps, Sarah and John Kaag. "The Use Of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles In Contemporary Conflict: A Legal And Ethical Analysis". Polity 44.2 (2012): 260-285. Web. 26 Jan. 2017. DOI: 10.1057/pol.2012.2.


ScanEagle Risk Assessment Tool ASCI 638- Human Factors in Unmanned Aero Sys Assignment 7.6-Operational Risk Assessment


ScanEagle Risk Assessment Tool
Scott E. Leishman
ASCI 638- Human Factors in Unmanned Aero Sys
 Assignment 7.6-Operational Risk Assessment
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide
January 11, 2017


















Risk Assessment Tool
          For this assignment I decided to do research on a tool created by Boeing for the ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.   This system was created in collaboration with Insitu Inc. The ScanEagle comes equipped with an Infrared camera or can alternatively be equipped with an Electro-Optical camera, which is mounted on the gyro-stabilized turret system created by the collaborative companies. This allows the camera to pan, tilt and zoom (ScanEagle, n.d.). This UAV is fully capable of operating autonomously and will work independently or has the capability to work in groups at altitudes up to and including 16,000 ft. with an endurance of more than 24 hours (ScanEagle, n.d.).  Aircraft general characteristics are listed in figure 1.
            Safety is always a major concern when anything unmanned is discussed. In order to decide what constitutes a hazard, a preliminary hazard list (figure 2) needs to be formulated. In order to create this list for this particular aircraft, focus was given on the operational stage during flight. In order to complete a hazard list and conduct a proper analysis key factors were reviewed, they included the following: avionics failure, lost link, engine failure, sensor malfunction, and midair collisions.  These hazards would then be assigned a numerical value. Once the numerical value was assigned, factors that contributed to those hazards are evaluated and given a similar numerical value, these factors included the following:  mitigating action, probability, risk level, and severity (Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2012).   Based off of the MIL-STD-8820/E form probability was assigned a category of severity based on the ratings of frequent, probable, occasional, remote, and improbable. This same rating was used for severity with descriptors being catastrophic, critical, marginal, and negligible as listed in table 4. The last step of the matrix was associating a number assigned to a given risk, where the higher number corresponded to a lower risk (Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2012).   Based off of information from figure 4, those numbers would then be input to figures 2 and 3. Based off of the matrix the lowest risks were associated with sensor malfunction in flight operation. This is primarily because the aircraft can still operate and be controlled safely back to receive repairs. Alternatively, the highest risk was associated with scenarios that involved lost link. This becomes problematic because the aircraft will continue to fly a pre-programmed route and re-establish links, in the event that it could not do so, such as the return to base portion not being programmed, the aircraft would ultimately go bingo fuel, then emergency fuel, resulting in a crash.
            The next step in completing the risk assessment tool for the ScanEagle was to conduct an operational hazard review and analysis (OHR&A) (figure 3) utilizing a template created by Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall (2012), and illustrated in figure 5.  Utilizing this risk assessment tool allows previously listed hazards to be evaluated and gives provisions on human factors such as how the human would interface with the equipment or operating systems associated with that equipment. This second step is similar to the creation of the preliminary hazard list/ analysis (PHL/A) but rather than have hazard column, the column is replaced with the term “action review.” In doing this second step, mitigating action can be assigned to each hazard, to determine if adequate support is given. In the event where the mitigating action was insufficient/inadequate, the hazard gets re-listed. Additionally, any instance where the mitigating action was able to modify any type of hazard, this would lead to the hazard being listed as well (Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2012).  
            This lead to the final product that is shown in figure 5. This risk assessment tool allows the ScanEagle operator and the crew the ability to rapidly asses the operation and mitigate any risks before the team follows through on the flight. This tool is a safety management tool, and allows for real time situations to be assessed and facilitates the operation to be continuously monitored (Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2012).  For unmanned aircraft operators, this tool acts like a preflight checklist and is essential for mission preparation. It allows for this mission to be briefed carefully, and any known or associated risks that could occur during the mission.























References
Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2012). Introduction to unmanned aircraft systems (1st ed.). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
Boeing: Historical Snapshot: ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. (2017). Boeing.com. Retrieved 12 January 2017, from http://www.boeing.com/history/products/scaneagle-unmanned-aerial-vehicle.page
























APPENDIX

   Figure 1 General Characteristics of Scan Eagle UAV
https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrzygVXfWu_OpOtmVEBy0CY9VJQcu0-U1_UgjFxXs9xmzhloHYzDmxlxR3lNp9fDwIl-3onAYYr4x3YwXySyDy0z4aKORLLALNhxsG_6Nq-HZROxCRUk2_mGlPcB67b08V5yduno4daug/s1600/2.png Figure 1. General Characteristics of Scan Eagle UAV, ScanEagle.           
Preliminary Hazard List/Analysis
https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh5kVVCJFI0G6bGltU_9hV_RSKGlHBb2lh9Fuppz8jqW5N5zvc1zOg-lyTJ1vUbC0dAdqB9F3gDR59Qn9nuUCC7xiW7uKCOywIT_oUykBmcqfvYI3HL55_JgAsZvW5BP1h1WPHxheDnlhQ/s1600/3.png
  Figure 2. An example of a Preliminary Hazards Assessment worksheet for the sUAS, ScanEagle.









Operation Hazard List/Analysis
https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgHx5Ix1xCWJpNTvq86nEJYlcvAthSKiGI2mIlZB1NYzlDtrgurfy6ZVS1wR6EEq9OTdrFoENQvmhqvFJzENJ2t3lIOxQKnhlEis_tIzUi6avJtHYRz1uD_gLUYe0JFu5kHRISUXFjmEAY/s1600/4.png
Figure 2. An example of Operational Hazard Review and Analysis worksheet for the sUAS, ScanEagle.              
Figure 4 Risk assessment matrix
https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiZm33sPXEkeHWMUH5GzMlEGKFmWlmBPBOJdjzOLnlNbinY0YxFiTwGGc-wWS_yANkAO-B8Mwi0qU2-fTHdNLKitcdeCHaKwEpxhVHJwoQL4PSaphl9UQ8zJfzGUjtJ3_zO4gIsZP6Wdkg/s1600/5.png
 Figure 4. ScanEagle Operational Risk Management worksheet.  This worksheet is borrowed/adapted from: Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2011).Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London: CRC Press.


Figure 5 ScanEagle Operational Risk Management worksheet
Image result for Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2011 risk assessment table

 Figure 5. ScanEagle Operational Risk Management worksheet.  This worksheet is borrowed/adapted from: Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2012).Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London: CRC Press. Page 128.

Automated Takeoff and Landing ASCI 638- Human Factors in Unmanned Aero Sys Assignment 6.6

Automated Takeoff and Landing
Scott E. Leishman
ASCI 638- Human Factors in Unmanned Aero Sys
Assignment 6.6
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide
January 3, 2017











                                                                         Automated System
 Automation is a technology that most of us have waited on, because it allows more time to focus on other intensive objectives. This technology is continuously evolving and is predominant in most unmanned aircraft systems. One area that appears to be significant in regards to automation is the realm of automated takeoff and landing, which requires very little if any human intervention. This discussion will review two types of aircraft, one for the manned realm (Airbus A-320) and one for the unmanned realm (the K-MAX unmanned aircraft system (UAS)).
Airbus A-320
The Airbus A-320 has the capability to be fully automated in its landing, to include the ability to steer the aircraft on the ground, as well as the ability to bring the aircraft to a halt, via an automated brake system (SKYbrary, 2016). This aircraft comes equipped with dual autopilots and satisfies Category II requirements (Decision Height (DH) of 100 feet or greater), as well as Category III requirements (DH of less than 100 feet). In order to engage the auto-land feature of the Airbus, the pilot is required to perform a sequence of steps whilst in autopilot. This begins firstly by engaging the Instrument Landing system (ILS), followed by selecting the Approach, subsequently the aircraft will then acquire the localizer and glideslope automatically, thus guiding the aircraft in for landing. While this part of the auto landing feature guides the aircraft, not every step is automated, such as lowering the gear, as well as setting flaps and ensuring the autopilot is in engaged if the DH is less than 100 feet (Avia Solutions Group, n.d.)
If the aircraft were to suffer some type of catastrophic failure, the aircraft can still be recovered safely by the pilot, whom has the ability to override any automation system within the aircraft (Avia Solutions Group, n.d.) If the event were to be fail passive, where there is significant deviation, the pilot would assume control aircraft. The fail passive portion of the Airbus is displayed on the Pilot’s Flight display (PFD), which in the event of a failure would be displayed on the Category III single display; alternatively if the failure was on operational event, the Category III would be a dual display and the automated system would finish out the remaining portions of the landing, a built in redundancy if you will (Airlinepilots.com, 1998)
K-MAX
            This unique UAS is capable of being configured for several different mission load outs, which include both civil and military operations. For purposes of this review, this author opted to review the automated portion of the optionally piloted configuration that the K-Max Offers, primarily used in Afghanistan by the United States Marine Corps (Weinberger, 2012).  What makes this UAS different is that it can be manned or unmanned, where the pilot’s controls are maintained for conversion back to a manned system (Kaman Aerospace & Lockheed Martin, 2010).
            In order to operate the K-MAX unmanned, the aircraft utilizes a satellite downlink in order to communicate between the avionics systems and the Mission Management Computer (MMC). The MMC is equipped on the aircraft in order to be pre-programmed with whatever the mission plan may be for that day, allowing the aircraft’s on-board control systems to be operated via the Flight Control Computer (FCC), a component that operates in conjunction with the MMC (Kaman Aerospace & Lockheed Martin, 2010). The FCC is what enables the K-MAX to have automated takeoff and landing capabilities. Alternatively, if the operators decide it is necessary to take control, the MMC can be instructed to relinquish control to someone on the ground at either the departure, destination, or any combination of the mission, in order to gain remote control of any portion of a mission (Kaman Aerospace & Lockheed Martin, 2010).
            New mission profiles can easily be changed by uploading new directives into the MMC from any GCS linked up with that particular UAS when the aircraft is operating from line-of-sight. The line-of-sight operations are conducted from the operator’s laptop, which is a portable ground control station. This UAS becomes reliable due to the redundancies built into the MMC, ensuring there is reliability and safeguards against any type of equipment failure (Kaman Aerospace & Lockheed Martin, 2010).
Summary
            Areas that could be looked at in regards to the A-320 would be improvements in automation, such as allowing the flight computer to make adjustments to the landing gear, and setting the flaps. One area that needs to be retained and is a key feature, is the ability to quickly override a system and operate the aircraft manually, this is paramount.  Further training would need to be done when using an automated landing system, which includes learning the ins and outs of auto- throttle, as well as the auto-brake systems. Pilot’s need to understand the instrumentation and any abnormalities that could occur, and manufacturers and safety experts need to develop safety protocols for each of those issues (Airlinepilots.com, 1998). Important areas to understand, and how they could affect performance, would be inclement weather and reports of any braking action less than good, or essentially anytime there are braking action advisories in effect.
            The K-MAX has the advantage of already having a well-established platform and was easily adapted to be automated because that was all that was left to be built on that system. Automation control and the interfaces those would appear on were all the manufacturers needed to focus on.  Again, an important training aspect would be weather and anomalies that could affect the performance of any automation. In 2013 a K-MAX crashed and was attributable to pilot error, a key component of this crash was that the pilot lost awareness due to weather constraints (Lamothe, 2014).
            In either circumstance, manned or unmanned, safety has got to be the primary focus in design. We cannot overly rely on automation and thus still need to know how to operate the aircraft without a dependence on automation. Training also needs to occur, and be sufficient enough for the Pilot’s/Operator’s to recognize an abnormality and correct it, or redundancies need to be built in, in order to negate any potential risk. Automation can certainly help an aircraft perform under much stricter conditions, but only if the design process is thoroughly thought out, and training is not compromised.










References

Airlinepilots.com,. (1998). Flight Operations Support & Line Assistance: GETTING TO GRIPS WITH CATEGORY II AND III OPERATIONS (3rd ed.). 31707 Blagnac Cedex France: Airbus. Retrieved from http://www.theairlinepilots.com/forumarchive/quickref/cat2.pdf
Avia Solutions Group,. Airbus A320: Auto Landing Tutorial - Video - Media center - Avia Solutions Group. Aviasg.com. Retrieved 4 January 2017, from http://www.aviasg.com/en/video/airbus-a320-auto-landing-tutorial.html
Kaman Aerospace, & Lockheed Martin,. (2010). K-MAX® Unmanned Aircraft System Optionally Piloted Cargo Lift Helicopter for the Warfighter (1st ed.). Bloomfield, CT: KAMAN AEROSPACE. Retrieved from http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/ms2/documents/K-MAX-brochure.pdf
Lamothe, D. (2014). Why pilots couldn’t stop a Marine Corps drone helicopter from crashing. Washington Post. Retrieved 4 January 2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/08/07/exclusive-why-pilots-couldnt-stop-a-marine-corps-drone-helicopter-from-crashing/?utm_term=.ccb525f79434
SKYbrary,. (2016). Autoland - SKYbrary Aviation Safety. Skybrary.aero. Retrieved 4 January 2017, from http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Autoland
Weinberger, S. (2012). K-MAX, the Military's New Delivery Drone. Popular Mechanics. Retrieved 4 January 2017, from http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a7573/k-max-the-militarys-new-unmanned-delivery-drone-7675091/


Shift Work Schedule ASCI 638- Human Factors in Unmanned Aero Sys Assignment 5.5

Shift Work Schedule
Scott E. Leishman
ASCI 638- Human Factors in Unmanned Aero Sys
Assignment 5.5
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide
December 20, 2016












Introduction
Due to crew complaints a review of the current squadron’s shift schedule, a 6 on and 2 off schedule has been evaluated and a proposal for a new and improved schedule has been generated. The current schedule has been found to be ineffective and detrimental to sleep patterns and is becoming problematic due to added fatigue and stress.  During a study conducted in 2011 by Chappelle, Salinas, and McDonald, 1,464 UAS operators were studied and indicated their dissatisfaction with a 6 on and 2 off schedule, learning from this study has helped to create a better schedule for the crew.
Problem
One of the challenges shift workers face is a type of schedule is combating sleep against a clock (UCLA, 2016). We all have an internal clock, our circadian rhythm, which help to regulate a majority of our body function, any interference with this rhythm could lead to a decline in alertness, being sleepy, change in hunger state, and our overall body temperature (UCLA, 2016). Because non-standard hours can interfere with this rhythm, many shift workers become deprived, lending a hand in poor performance.  Some research indicates it can take up to three years to become fully adapted to shift work, other research has indicated that no one can fully acclimate to this rotational shift work (UCLA, 2016).  While sleep deprivation that is continual in nature can be alarming, shift workers can also be victims of shift work disorder, which leads to depression, insomnia, and a difficulty in concentrating (National sleep Foundation, 2016).
            Rapidly rotating shifts has been said to be detrimental in allowing the body adequate time to adjust to circadian rhythm (sleep/wake cycles) according to Burgress (2007). Burgress also stated that circadian rhythm adjustments tend to occur rapidly within the first few days of change, and continue to slow down thereafter when shift changes less than 7 days occur, leading to no permanence in rhythm (Burgress, 2007).  Because of this, the members that use the current weekly rotation schedule are stuck in a continual phase of circadian adjustment and suffer fatigue as a consequence. Burgress suggested that the most optimal shift rotation schedule is one where the rotation is a forward rotation, more specifically days, swings, nights (2007). While this rotation is in use, the extent of its effectiveness is thwarted by the briefness of the cycle.
Solution
            In general there appears to be two trains of thought when it comes to a rotating shift cycle, more so on night shifts. One suggests that shifts that occur in short rotation, less than 3 days, while the other suggests long rotations, often two weeks or more. With the short schedule the idea is that our bodies would not have time to adjust, meaning circadian rhythm would not be interrupted. Alternatively, long cycles would allow our bodies to fully adjust; consequently research does not indicate which one is more preferred (American College, 2003). Having stated that, the consensus across the boards remains the same when it comes to a 4-7 night cycle of night shifts and should be avoided entirely, in part due to the fact the body starts to adjust to a the new rhythm and then gets thrown into another cycle (American College, 2003).
            In order avoid this type of scheduling, it is suggested to use a Metropolitan Rota schedule, where the cycle is repeated either during the longer or shorter period. The Metropolitan Rota is a 4/2x cycle where there are 2 day shifts, 2 swing shifts, followed by 2 night shifts, and that would conclude with 2 days off.  In using this proposed schedule, a normal shift of 8 hours would occur with no more than 48 hours occurring for a work week, unless an emergency or contingency operation needed to ensue. While a 6 day work week could appear to be a negative, it is substantially better compared to a 4 or 5 day work week with 12 hour shifts. Leveraging this proposed schedule, in the event a crew member was absent, during each cycle operators could cover a missing member by extending 4 hours beyond their shift, either in the preceding or proceeding shift, which would allow the crew members to abide by Air Force Instruction 11-202 Volume 3, General Flight Rules (USAF, 2014).  The schedule would look like the following in Table 1.
Table 1. Metropolitan Shift
https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgDPV_69P0H_idfI1W6F2RZiuro0w1seimx7zAqOWyVcfq91iql6EHmKOr6HhAI-5skUO2IKMO7xb8Zap9FL3HGDDkKGkbmtRYtAkXFTkMkx8aeCn6LOyl1hBYrBbrrjv0Vy7kYZEJnme4/s1600/AppendixA.png
Miller, J.  (2012, April).  White paper: Shift plans with seven consecutive shifts.  Retrieved from  
https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/crm/docs/Shift_Plans_with_Seven.pdf














References
AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 11-202 General Flight Rules. (2014) (3rd ed., pp. 99-105). Retrieved from http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/acc/publication/afi11-202v3_accsup_i/afi11-202v3_accsup_i.pdf
American College of Emergency Physicians. (2003). Retrieved 20 December 2016, from https://www.acep.org/Clinical---Practice-Management/Circadian-Rhythms-and-Shift-Work/
Burgess, P. (2007). Optimal Shift Duration and Sequence: Recommended Approach for Short-Term Emergency Response Activations for Public Health and Emergency Management. Retrieved 20 December 2016, from
Chappelle, W., Salinas, A., & McDonald, K. (2011). Psychological Health Screening of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Operators and Supporting Units (1st ed.). Wright Patterson AFB, OH: USAF School of Aerospace Medicine. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a582856.pdf
Miller, J. (2012). White Paper: Shift Plans with Seven Consecutive Shifts (1st ed.). Retrieved from https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/crm/docs/Shift_Plans_with_Seven.pdf
National Sleep Foundation. (2016). Sleepfoundation.org. Retrieved 20 December 2016, from https://sleepfoundation.org/shift-work/content/shift-work-disorder-%E2%80%93-symptoms
UCLA,. (2016). Coping with Shift WorkSleepcenter.ucla.edu. Retrieved 20 December 2016, from http://sleepcenter.ucla.edu/coping-with-shift-work